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There is a longstanding norm against the development and use of chemical and biological 
weapons, which is embodied in two global prohibition regimes. Review of the efficiency and 
of the effectiveness of these regimes needs to be considered in the light of the changing 
scientific, technological and political context.. In this report we discuss a project which has 
sought to contribute to a review of these regimes through engagement with UK parliamentarians 
and the general public. 
 
This summary report of the project contains the following 5 sections. Section 1 is the 
background introduction, Section 2 gives a brief overview of a research report and its 
distribution, section 3 then deals with two new methods we used to publicise the report: our 
webinar and the cartoons which we produced to enhance the spread and understanding of the 
report. Then section 4 gives a review of the feedback we received about the report and the final 




There is a strong tradition of civil society interest in strengthening the Chemical and Biological 
Weapons Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Regimes. Input to State and Inter-State 
discussions have been and is being provided by many Non-State groups including such well 
known organisations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Pugwash 
group of scientists. Moreover, very different methods have been used by different groups at 
different times in critical but constructive engagement between civil society and policy-makers 
on efforts to strengthen both regimes1.   
 
In 2020, we started a series of projects on “Strengthening the Biological and Chemical Weapons 
Conventions”. This project titled “Informing Policymakers of the Progress in Strengthening the 
Chemical and Biological Weapons Non-Proliferation Regime” is one of the projects. This 
project was selected by London Metropolitan University for funding via the UK Research and 
Innovation (UKRI) Strategic Priorities Fund.  
 
This project fits within that diverse tradition of civil society efforts to strengthen the norm 
against chemical and biological weapons and aimed to provide the UK Parliament and general 
public with a concise report on the present state of these regimes and the options for 
strengthening them after the pandemic in the run up to the 2022 9th Review Conference of the 
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and the 2023 5th Review Conference of 
the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). This project also aimed to explore new informative 
and simple ways to disseminate our research and build up closer connections for further 
engagement with policymakers. 
 
The project was carried out between November 2020 and March 2021 with 4 stages: Stage 1: 
to write and present a report on current CWC and BTWC issues to the UK Parliament in late 
January 2021; Stage 2: to disseminate this information about biological security to the general 
public through the media, for example via a webinar and educational video at the end of January 
2021. Stage 3 was to collect feedback from the UK Parliament by the end of Feb/Middle of 
March 2021 and Stage 4 to write a project report at the end of March 2021. 
 
The impact of this project is documented by a report to UK Parliament, education videos on the 
report and webinar, a series of cartoons, and interviews and feedbacks from general public and 
the parliamentarians. This project is also directly linked to our three other projects: 1) 





at the 2021 9th Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) 
with a Focus on Codes of Conduct and Biological Security Education for Life Scientists, funded 
by London Metropolitan University Rescaling Fund; 2) A Civil Society Input to the 2021 9th 
Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), funded by the 
Joseph Rowntree grant application; and 3) Developing a Comprehensive Global Strategy on 
Biosecurity Education for Life Scientists, an APEX Award Application (pending).  
 
Along with other projects, this project particularly aims to 1) support evidence-based research 
and policy making; 2) facilitate effective communication and active engagement with 
policymakers; 3) address international challenges with academic research and public 
engagement; 4) provide educational material for the general public on biological and chemical 
security issues; and 5) promote research communities and collaborations within London 
Metropolitan University and beyond. 
 




The project aimed to produce a short 5,000 word jargon-free summary of the present state of 
these two regimes and of the options for strengthening them in the immediate future through to 
2023. All six authors were responsible for the whole report, but different people took 
responsibility for drafting different sections according to their research specialisations. The 
report was written and produced in hard copy in late January 2021 according to the plan2.  The 
contents were arranged as shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: The Contents of the Report   
1. Introduction 
2. The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)  
- Cooperation and Assistance (MX1)  
- Review of Science and Technology under the BTWC (MX2)  
- National Implementation of the BTWC (MX3)  
- Assistance, Response and Preparedness under the BTWC (MX4)  
- Institutional Strengthening of the BTWC (MX5) 
3. The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)  
- Syria  
- Novichoks  
- Central Nervous System-Acting Chemicals  
- Riot Control Agents (RCAs)  
- RCAs Means of Delivery 
4 Conclusions and Recommendations 
References 
 
In order to help people unfamiliar with the subject of the report, a Summary section was 
provided at the start and specific recommendations were set out both in the Summary section 
and in the final section 4 on Conclusions and Recommendations. For those readers who wanted 
to delve deeper into these issues we also provided a full set of 59 references. The whole report 






2.2 Distribution of the report 
 
Printed copies of the report were sent to the 125 members of the House of Commons and House 
of Lords who were selected mainly by their participation in the relevant Select Committees 
such as the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, Defence Committee, Foreign 
Affairs Committee, Health and Social Care Committee, Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
Committee, Science and Technology Committee of House of Commons; International Relations 
and Defence Committee, Food, Poverty, Health and the Environment Committee of House of 
Lords; and members with Front Bench responsibilities. Copies were also sent to relevant 
support facilities within the Parliament such as the Knowledge Exchange Unit at The 
Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, House of Commons Library, and House of 
Lords Library.  
 
At the same time a London Metropolitan University Press Release was sent out to a range of 
journalists with potential interest in the subject. Given the overwhelming concentration of the 
media on dealing with the immediate problem of the impact of the pandemic we were not 
expecting too much from the Press Release. However, it turned out we were quite surprised by 
our success. Frank Gardner, the BBC Security Correspondent gave our work an airing on the 
important Today radio programme3 and the widely read regional newspaper the Yorkshire Post 
gave an excellent summary of the Report4. Furthermore, the most thorough coverage was a long 
and detailed interview (written by Gwyn Winfield, the chief editor) with Professor Shang in the 
specialist journal CBRNe World which reaches many people involved in chemical and 
biological defence issues around the world5.  
 
London Metropolitan University provided a dedicated webpage for the project6. Therefore the 
report is freely accessible7. The digital copies of the report were sent to the Parliamentarians a 
few days after publication (as many were expected not to be frequently in London given the 
pandemic conditions). The electronical version of the report was also disseminated to our 
networking and collaborators around the world, such as the Center for Biosafety Research and 
Strategy; Tianjin University, China; UNIDIR and the UN BTWC Implement Support Unit. 
 
3. New Methods of Publicizing the Report 
 
In our original project plan, a public lecture was to be held at London Metropolitan University 
but due to the lockdown this became impossible. We changed our plan so as to have a webinar 
and we also reconsidered how we could use the social media to best publicize the report. We 
organized the webinar and created a subproject to produce a series of cartoons. Both new 
approaches turned to be very successful. We review them below. 
 
3.1 Webinar   
 
Preparation and promotion  
Our main plan in the conditions at the end of January 2021 was to contact as many people as 
possible using a webinar. We therefore replaced the public lecture originally planned with an 
online webinar. The promotion of the webinar was carried out in the beginning of the New Year 
to allow maximum of visibility. The Research Postgraduate Office (RPO) at London 
Metropolitan University was heavily involved in its delivery and gave great support. The 
webinar was also carefully advertised through our own networks by the University Media 
Centre and two short videos8,9 prepared to go onto the internet during the period when people 
could register and when they were waiting for the webinar to begin after signing in. Using the 
short video to promote the webinar is something new we introduced in the project. We found it 





method in the future projects. The event was promoted via our internal network, including 
internal research mailing list and doctoral studies Weblearn through the University RPO.  
 
Delivery  
The webinar consisted of a short introduction by Professor Shang and then short presentations 
by the team which ran through the contents of the Report and ended with the introduction of a 
cartoon. The presentations were followed by a Q&A session. The webinar lasted for one and 
half hours. The event was recorded and is available to watch on demand via the project 
website10. The webinar recording and follow-up survey (see appendix) were shared with all 
registered attendees. 
 
We had 279 people registered on the Eventbrite, and around 175 people attended the webinar, 
including those who joined via anonymous dial-in. Registered attendees came from over 40 
different countries, such as United States-37%, UK-17%, Germany-5%, France-3%, Canada-
3%, Switzerland-3%, and others. 3% were London Metropolitan University staff and students, 
97% were from outside.  
 
We also analyzed the background of the registered attendees. 21% were members of staff at 
another HE institution, or a student at another HE institution, 10%. 67% were not affiliated with 
another HE education institution, and 2% gave no answer. In those who are not affiliated with 
another HE education institution, 41% are from the public sector (not Higher Education), 9% 
from the private sector, 4% from the voluntary sector, and 19% from other sectors and 27% 
gave no answer.  
 
From these data, we are very pleased about the coverage of our targeted audience, and this 
therefore guaranteed a successful delivery of the aims of the project to a broad audiences. This 
is also evidenced in the feedback survey analysis below.   
 
Feedback survey  
We carried out a webinar feedback online survey after the webinar (see Appendix), and the 
purpose of the survey was to elicit general views of the webinar and opinions on some of the 
key issues addressed in the report and webinar presentations. 
 
The survey received excellent feedback. 39 people took part in the webinar follow-up survey. 
72% of survey respondents indicated that their professional background was in the life or 
chemical sciences. In terms of occupation, different professional spheres including academia, 
government, international organisations, industry, and civil society organisations were 
presented (Box 1). 
 









Survey respondents were largely familiar with the chemical and biological non-proliferation 
regime. The majority of respondents were not convinced that either the Biological and Toxin 
Weapons Convention (BTWC) or the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in their current 
state are effective in countering the threat of biological and chemical weapons (Box 2). 
 





Survey respondents largely supported the options for strengthening the BTWC and CWC 
identified in the report. Boxes 3 and 4 provided summaries of responses on some of our selected 
questions representing some of main concerns in current situations. Due to the limited time and 
the nature of the webinar, detailed recommendations and options on strengthening BTWC and 
CWC were not able to be fully discussed. We planned to provide a full report which will be 
used at the BTWC review conference along with our other projects.  
 

















As part of the survey, participants were invited to share their views on the prospects for 
strengthening the chemical and biological non-proliferation regime (Box 5), as well as any 
general impressions of the webinar (Box 6). These were also reflected in some of interesting 
questions and discussions during the webinar Q&A session. In general, all these responses 
showed great passion and willingness to be involved in BTWC and CWC issues, particularly 
from many life scientists. This met our purpose of raising awareness and engaging with the 
general public. From the survey, there is clearly a need to have more this kind of webinar for 
education and discussion.  
 
Box 5: Survey respondents’ views on the strengthening of the CBW disarmament regime 
 
“There is little prospect for improved organizational approaches to strengthen the BTWC – the 
(correct) observation that the BWC has limited capability to prevent the hostile use of the life sciences 
does not mean that modification of the BTWC or its institutional structure could change that. You 





automatically mean those limitations can be fixed. More can probably be done to clarify what is 
permitted and not permitted in the CWC regime.” 
 
“Scientists working with dual-use materials and technologies are the key stakeholders of the 
regimes. Unfortunately, most of them have never heard of the BWC or CWC. In most countries, non-
proliferation regimes are perceived as political meetings of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This 
disconnect needs to be rectified by raising awareness and engaging the broader scientific 
community, if we are to strengthen the non-proliferation regimes.” 
 
“Far wider outreach is needed to ensure the implications of the regimes are understood among all 
scientists and clear, realistic repercussions are needed to act as a deterrent. The BTWC has no 
authority so has very little leverage to ensure adherence. This should be addressed as a matter of 
urgency.” 
 
“It is going to be a very difficult road. The political environment seems ever more resistant to such 
change.” 
 
“Processes will continue and the context for application of procedures and requirements will change. 
In principle, some of this may be said to be a strengthening. It is not possible to state with certainty. 
Views and understanding will inevitably vary.” 
 
“Prospects will improve once geopolitical tensions are reduced.” 
 
“Difficult at present given the divergence of views between Russia and allies in one camp and 
Western nations in the other.” 
 
“Although civil society/academia and others can contribute to the strengthening of the regimes, 
nothing can happen with the States Parties not willing to end the almost deadlock. Main spoilers 
Iran, Russia and the US have to start a dialogue (again).” 
 
“The main issue is that the BTWC and CWC have limited enforcement and accountability. There does 
need to be a mechanism like OPCW for bioweapons or suspicions of biological weapons, this would 
assuage COVID-19 type conspiracies and further elements of the Conventions.” 
 
 
Box 6: Survey respondents’ general impressions of the webinar 
 
“Good webinar. Important issues covered.” 
 
“I was a little disappointed that more was not connected to COVID-19 specifically given the title of 
the webinar; much of the discussion focused on the BWC/CWC and their futures in general.” 
 
“Terrific program. Efficient and compact (essential for pandemic times, sadly). Good speakers 
although more balanced with respect to gender and age might be helpful.” 
 
“I enjoyed it. It was a good background review. We still need to discuss in great depth the impact of 
COVID-19 on the BTWC.” 
 
“It was short but an excellent webinar.” 
 
“Good mix of speakers and topics.” 
 
“Covering important aspects, broad and presented in an understandable way.” 
 






“It was a good introduction to the regimes but did not really address the pandemic and potential 
effects of it, which was my reason for attending. The Q&A session went into a little more detail on 
this matter but I was hoping for more reflection in the main presentation.” 
 
“Impressive attendance from around the world.” 
 





From the above survey, the following conclusions are drawn: 
• The webinar was effective in promoting awareness and fostering a debate on the 
future of the CB non-proliferation and disarmament regime after COVID-19. 
• The webinar was well attended by a wide range of stakeholders from different 
countries around the world. 
• The webinar has demonstrated that novel communication tools, such as videos and 




Finding an effective way to inform the general public and those who are new to the area of 
BTWC has always been one of our main objectives. However, earlier research on this subject 
has revealed some of the challenges to promoting awareness and understanding of biological 
security and dual-use issues, as well as the utility of scenarios for illustrating these issues in a 
more interesting and easily assimilated form. Therefore, at the beginning of the project, we 
chose to use a new approach which entailed designing cartoons to convey the complexity of 
BTWC issues. A sample cartoon11 was developed and presented during the webinar. The 
cartoon was well received.  
 
Therefore, we decided to extend this venture further to produce a series of cartoons around the 
current topics that are in the focus of BTWC and CWC activities. The rationale behind the 
cartoon series was to produce a novel biological security educational tool which could be used 
for teaching and training. For example, the cartoons could be used as illustrative scenarios for 
generating discussion on key issues of relevance to the BTWC. The tool could easily be adapted 
for use with stakeholders in the chemical sciences which is why it is considered relevant to the 
purposes of both the BTWC and CWC. We have produced five cartoons in this series and titled 
the series ‘Strengthening the Web of Prevention against Chemical and Biological Weapons 
after COVID-19’. The cartoons focus on five key issues related to biological and chemical 
security: 1) Preventing Biological Weapons; 2) Codes of Conduct; 3) Education and 
Awareness-Raising; 4) Evaluation; and 5) Integration.  
 
Due to the popularity of these cartoons from audience all over of the world in our webinar, and 
also our dedicated efforts to promote this effective way of dissemination, we decided to have 
all of these cartoons translated into the six official UN languages (Arabic, Chinese, English, 
French, Russia, and Spanish)12. The translations have been produced by experts in the field of 
biological and chemical security education. A stage two subproject for translating the cartoons 
in other languages such as Japanese, German, Italian, Portuguese, Greek, and etc is also under 
the way and will be finished in due course. We have already received kind comments from our 






4. Reflection and Feedback  
 
Our original intention was to visit the Houses of Parliament and to talk to a number of MPs and 
Lords about their response to our Report. Unfortunately given the pandemic and the national 
lockdown this was not possible. Therefore, we closely monitored what other ways could be 
used to achieve our planned activities. 
  
4.1 Active approach and utilising of existing facilities 
 
During the process of this project engaging with Parliament, we closely followed the existing 
advice provided from within Parliament.  The Knowledge Exchange Unit of the UK Parliament 
helps to facilitate the provision of relevant civil society research to members of Parliament and 
has a very useful website with advice on the best ways to provide research to Parliament13. We 
followed their guidelines closely for example by focusing on the members of relevant Select 
Committees, and particularly on the Joint Committee for National Security Strategy as people 
within our project group had made submissions related to our report to the Committee's report 
on Biosecurity and National Security published in December 202014 and to the same Committee 
in the last Parliament.15,16  We also followed the detailed advice on how a report should be kept 
clear and concise with a short summary to begin, but with full detailed references that could 
easily be checked. With our cartoons we additionally followed the advice to use visual 
materials17. Their advice on publicity in order to get members' attention to the report was also 
followed closely with the Press Release and the webinar aimed at increasing interest in the 
report. We had intended when planning the report in late 2020 to discuss our report in face-to-
face interviews with members after publication, but that was not possible in the lockdown 
period. However, it is our intention to do this later in the year when travel is possible, and States 
Parties are again able to meet in The Hague and Geneva.  
 
4.2 Monitoring and impact 
 
We designed dedicated webinar and report feedback online survey (details see above). This 
helped us to reflect and assess the success of the project. We received a detailed and 
encouraging reply from one member of the House of Lords suggesting a specific way in which 
our report could have been presented in a more useful way for Parliament and indicating a 
willingness to try arrange a virtual meeting for us with an appropriate all-party group of 
members and their researchers. Due to the time, we are not able to further develop other ways 
of using video for dissemination. This is something we plan to do in the future projects.  
 
As to our new venture of developing a series of cartoons for communicating with Parliament 
and general publics, we received immediate feedback and we have even seen some of its initial 
impact. One colleague (Maria Espona in Argentina) wrote: “We are starting a responsible 
science (linked to export control) project in Armenia, and Emilya Titanyan, who is leading it, 
attended your latest [webinar] event. I suggested to use the cartoons as a tool, and she developed 
the attached ones. These are preliminary, but I think it is a superb starting point! I am thrilled 
about this! It is so great to see the impact of your job on younger generations.” We therefore 
extended our original cartoon production into a sub project (see above). This project was highly 
appraised by our colleagues in the areas. Therefore, we asked some of them to help us to 
translate them into their native languages, they all volunteered to help. We believe this will not 
only communicate BTWC issues in a simpler way but also will bring some impact to help others 
to explore their own ways of thinking. This work is written as a paper and to be submitted to 
Frontiers in Political Science.  
 






Apart from the above ways to publishing our project, we have also sought opportunities when 
we go to conferences and meetings of States Parties later this year and next year. We produced 
two posters and submitted to the SCIENCE · PEACE · SECURITY ’21 conference, 8-10 
September 2021, RWTH Aachen University, Germany (sps21.fonas.org). This conference will 
address five specific themes: (1) Bringing Science and Politics closer together, (2) Confidence 
Building Measures, Treaties and Institutions, (3) Dual-use Technology & Responsible 
Innovation, (4) Information Manipulation & Disinformation, and (5) Increasing Autonomy in 
Weapon Systems. Therefore, it is a good fit for reporting our project.  
 
We will also link this project with our other ongoing projects (see above) to further engage 
more with the Parliament and the general publics. 
 
5. Impact of the Project and future work 
 
The 2018 UK Biological Security Strategy 17 was widely considered to be of high quality. It 
covered understanding, preventing, detecting and responding to the threat from the UK’s strong 
scientific and industrial base. The importance of the BTWC and other international agreements 
was noted with the Strategy stating that the strategy would involve: 
 
“Continuing to engage with the USA, Canada and other international partners both bilaterally 
and in forums such as the GP, BTWC, UNSGM and Australia Group in order to: 
– Maintain and enhance the international legal regime prohibiting biological weapons; 
– Strengthen control of dangerous biological materials, associated equipment and 
expertise to prevent accidental release and deliberate or accidental misuse – this includes 
coordination of export controls to prevent exports contributing to the development of 
biological weapons; 
– Strengthen UN operational capabilities to investigate allegations of biological weapon 
use.” 
 
As was pointed out in the Joint Committee on National Security Strategy’s first report in 
December 202018, the strategy did not prove to be effectively implemented during the COVID-
19 pandemic. The Government’s response19 to the Joint Committee’s report makes it clear that 
there will be a major review and practical response to this failure. The response stating in reply, 
for example, in regard to Recommendation 11: 
 
“Government will, at an appropriate time, review the UK Biological Security Strategy in 
light of lessons learnt from responding to the COVID-19 pandemic. A list of principal 
commitments and an operational action plan for delivering them will likely be developed 
as part of this process. Progress against commitments will be monitored by a refreshed 
governance structure with a greater focus on human and animal health.” 
 
And in reply to Recommendation 12 that: 
 
“The Government takes biosecurity very seriously and has already established the new 
Institute for Health Protection to advance the UK’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic, 
using a rigorous science-led approach. Urgent work to identify where responsibility for 
biosecurity should sit long-term is underway, and we recognise the need for a resilient 
and enduring approach to biological security. A greater focus on human, animal, and plant 
health will be fundamental. Government will strengthen links to the National Security 
Risk Assessment process, and between government departments, professional 







And in reply to Recommendation 13 that: 
 
“The Government is in the midst of managing a public health emergency the like of which 
we have not seen for generations. It would be unwise to commit to a new biological 
security approach until we have learnt all of the lessons from the COVID-19 pandemic. 
We absolutely recognise the importance of a clear strategic direction for biological 
security, which is refreshed on a regular basis. Our experience of responding to other 
health and biosecurity emergencies, along with new and emerging risks, will help inform 
our approach. We will also consider declassifying information about the methodologies 
for assessing the impact and likelihood of natural hazards to help inspire greater public 
confidence and debate.” 
 
Within that process of reviewing and reinvigorating the UK’s Biological Security Strategy there 
would appear to be many opportunities for civil society to assist in the process, including in 
relation to the Chemical and Biological Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Regimes. 
 
For a very recent example, at the recent Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons 
96th Session of the Executive Council, a Statement by the Permanent Representative of 
Switzerland to the OPCW also emphased the role of civil society input in regard to one of the 
key points in our report on the dangers of CNS-Acting Chemicals (CNSACs):  
 
“This initiative builds on the work previously conducted over many years by a group of 
States-Parties, but also on the efforts of the scientific community and civil society. Of 
particular importance is the extensive work of the Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) in 
characterizing and identifying riot control (RCA) agents and underlining that in contrast 
to RCAs aerosolized CNSACs cannot currently be safely used for law enforcement.” 
 
This project is an excellent example of how civil society input can be achieved. During the 
short period of time of the project, there are two reports, three videos, and five cartoons in about 
twelve languages were produced and two papers to be written and submitted. The project held 
a webinar and planned several interviews and useful feedback from Parliamentarians. 
 
The specific future work from this project would be: 
 
• Engaging of parliament and future project, including the government department 
involvement, and following up; 
• Awareness raising for academic and general public ; 
• Networking and research collaboration (team work, extended networking with China, 
American, India, UN etc and leading to further development to building up LMU centre 
for Biosecurity); 
• Part of longterm research strategy of civil society input to biosecurity and parallel work 
with other ongoing and pending projects. 
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The Chemical and Biological Non-Proliferation Regime after COVID-19 
 
Thank you for taking part in today’s webinar. We would appreciate your feedback on the issues 
raised during the webinar. The survey is anonymous and its results may appear in the final 
project report.  
1. Please share any general impressions and comments on the webinar. 
• [open question] 
 
2. I was familiar with the chemical and biological non-proliferation regime prior to the webinar. 
• Strongly agree 
• Agree 
• Neither agree, nor disagree 
• Disagree 
• Strongly disagree 
 
3. I am interested in chemical and biological non-proliferation and disarmament issues. 
• Strongly agree 
• Agree 
• Neither agree, nor disagree 
• Disagree 
• Strongly disagree 
 
4. I am aware of recent developments in the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention 
(BTWC) and/or the Chemical Weapons Convention. 
• Strongly agree 
• Agree 
• Neither agree, nor disagree 
• Disagree 
• Strongly disagree 
 
5. The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention is effective in preventing the hostile misuse 
of life sciences? 
• Strongly agree 
• Agree 
• Neither agree, nor disagree 
• Disagree 
• Strongly disagree 
 
6. Life sciences stakeholders (e.g. in academia, industry, government) can contribute to 
strengthening the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. 
• Strongly agree 
• Agree 
• Neither agree, nor disagree 
• Disagree 
• Strongly disagree 
 
7. Are you aware of educational and/or training programmes in biological security that are 
specifically addressed at life sciences students and/or practitioners? 







8. A formal process for the review and assessment of life sciences advances needs to be 
established within the framework of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). 
• Strongly agree 
• Agree 
• Neither agree, nor disagree 
• Disagree 
• Strongly disagree 
 
9. The Chemical Weapons Convention is effective in countering the threat of chemical 
weapons. 
• Strongly agree 
• Agree 
• Neither agree, nor disagree 
• Disagree 
• Strongly disagree 
 
10. The existing international mechanisms for investigation and establishing accountability in 
case of use of chemical weapons (e.g. in Syria) need to be strengthened.  
• Strongly agree 
• Agree 
• Neither agree, nor disagree 
• Disagree 
• Strongly disagree 
 
11. States should put on hold the development, manufacture, and use of all weapons employing 
central nervous system-acting chemicals until the OPCW determines the legality of these 
chemicals for law enforcement purposes under the Chemical Weapons Convention. 
• Strongly agree 
• Agree 
• Neither agree, nor disagree 
• Disagree 
• Strongly disagree 
 
12. Clear international rules are needed to ensure that riot control agents (RCAs) – tear gas and 
pepper spray – are not deployed in violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention and human 
rights standards. 
• Strongly agree 
• Agree 
• Neither agree, nor disagree 
• Disagree 
• Strongly disagree 
 
13. Civil society (e.g. academia, think tanks, industry, and professional associations) has a role 
to play in strengthening the chemical and biological non-proliferation and disarmament regime. 
• Strongly agree 
• Agree 
• Neither agree, nor disagree 
• Disagree 






14. In your view, what are the prospects for strengthening the chemical and biological non-
proliferation and disarmament regime? 
• [open question] 
 
Finally, please tell us a bit about yourself: 




Which of the following best describes your current occupation? 
• Academia (work or study) 
• Government 
• International Organisation 
• Industry 
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